Goldman's ‘Level-2’ act descriptions and utilitarian generalization by Silverstein, Harry S. & Goldman, Holly S.
H A R R Y  S. S I L V E R S T E I N  
GOLDMAN'S 'LEVEL-2' A C T  D E S C R I P T I O N S  A N D  
U T I L I T A R I A N  G E N E R A L I Z A T I O N  
(Receded 26 June, 1975) 
In 'David  Lyons  o n  Ut i l i t a r ian  Gene ra l i za t ion  '1 Hol ly  G o l d m a n  argues as 
fol lows:  
(I) Lyons 2 claims that the principles 
(UG) An action is right if and only if the consequences of everyone's performing 
that sort of action would be at least as good as the consequences of 
everyone's performing any alternative sort of action. 
and 
(AU) An action is right if and only if the consequences of that action would be 
at least as good as the consequences of any alternative action. 
are extensionally equivalent. Even if we use Lyons' defective notion of 'consequences', 
however, this claim can be shown to be false. For extensional equivalence presupposes 
that the number of persons who can perform an action of a given sort does not vary 
from alternative to alternative; and on Lyons' own criterion for act descriptions, this 
presupposition fails. However, 
(II) this difficulty can be avoided by adopting a new criterion for act- descriptions, a 
criterion according to which reference to the available alternatives must be included in 
the description of every action. But while the adoption of such a criterion insures that 
the number of persons who can do 'the same' will remain constant throughout an 
alternative set, ff neither saves the extensional equivalence of UG and AU nor makes UG 
a viable moral principle. For on this criterion there are various cases - including certain 
of those 'threshold' cases of voting, lawn-crossing, etc., which provided the original 
motivation for UG - where the number of agents who can do ' the same' as a given 
alternative is indeterminate, cases where, therefore, UG gives no (determinate) result at 
all. 
I agree, o n  the  whole ,  w i t h  (I) .  3 (II) ,  howeve r ,  is m i s t a k e n ;  I shall  p resen t  
two ,  i n d e p e n d e n t  cr i t ic isms o f  G o l d m a n ' s  a r g u m e n t  each  o f  w h i c h  a lone  is 
s u f f i c i e n t ' t o  show tha t ,  i f  h e r  c r i t e r ion  for  act  desc r ip t ions  is h a n d l e d  
p rope r ly ,  i t  yields exac t ly  the  same,  en t i r e ly  d e t e r m i n a t e ,  resul t  as L y o n s '  for  
t he  sor t  o f  case she considers .  4 The  first cr i t ic ism is c o n c e r n e d  w i t h  one  o f  
t he  f u n d a m e n t a l  fea tures  o f  u t i l i t a r i an  genera l iza t ion ;  t he  second  is c o n c e r n e d  
w i t h  a po in t  w h i c h  re la tes  n o t  mere ly  to  u t i l i t a r ian  genera l iza t ion ,  b u t  to  
consequen t i a l i s t  r eason ing  in general .  
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I. GOLDMAN'S  ARGUMENT 
Goldman  gives t h e  fol lowing accoun t  o f  her  p roposed  cr i ter ion for  act 
descr ipt ions:  
What we need are action descriptions which include (a) reference to the consequentially 
significant properties of the action, and (b) reference to the action's alternatives, 
similarly described in terms of their consequentially significant properties. This can be 
arranged most conveniently by introducing two 'levels' of action types (where an action 
type is understood to be a property that can hold true of individual actions). Action 
types of the first level are defined in terms of the consequentially significant properties 
of the action, and action types of the second level are defined in terms of the level-1 
type of the action, taken in conjunction with the level-I types of its alternatives. 
Consider, for example, a case in which an agent possesses two alternatives, acts a and b. 
The definitions of the level-1 types of these actions would appear as follows: 
Level-1 Definitions 
act a is of type A at level 1 = df. a has consequentially 
significant properties 
P1, P2, ..., Pk 
act b is of type B at level 1 = df. b has consequentially 
significant properties 
al,  02 ..... Ok 
The definitions of the level-2 types of these actions would then appear as foUows: 
Level-2 Definitions: 
ac ta  is of typeA'  at level 2 = df. a is of type A at level 1, 
and a's sole alternative is 
of type B at level 1. 
act b is of type B' at level 2 = df. b is of type B at level 1, 
and b's sole alternative is 
of type A at level 1. 
... we now stipulate that the relevant description of an action specifies which level-2 
action type is true of it ... (86-87) 
She t h e n  applies this cr i ter ion to a case involving 
... Smith, Jones, and Brown, who are neighbors in an apartment house and share a yard. 
They agree to split the expenses of any play equipment to be installed in the yard for the 
use of their children. According to their agreement, the majority rules in such decisions: 
if two of them wish to purchase a certain piece of equipment, the other is bound to pay 
his share of the expenses. In the case at issue, question has been raised whether or not a 
swing set should be purchased for the children. If it is, the utility produced will be 10; if 
not, the utility produced will be 3. (88) 
Suppose  tha t  Brown tries to  use UG to decide wha t  to  do,  given tha t  b o t h  
Smi th  and  Jones  will in fact  vote  ' no ' .  Brown has two  alternit ives,  an act  o f  
type  Y (a 'yes '  vote)  or an act  o f  type  N (a ' no '  vote).  " In  order  for  Brown to  
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ascertain which act ion UG advises him to take" ,  Go ldman  argues, 
he must first identify the set of agents who have the opportunity to perform relevantly 
similar acts (i.e., acts of types Y and N). Having identified these agents, he can then 
calculate the consequences of everyone's performing these alternatives, and on this basis 
derive a recommendation from UG on which action to perform. 
Which agents do have the opportunity to perform acts of these types.* In particular, 
which agents have the opportuity to perform an act of type Y (roughly, which agents are 
in a position to vote 'yes' when two 'no' votes are cast)? Until Brown himself acts, there 
is no determinate answer to this question. If Brown should vote 'yes', then neither Smith 
nor Jones will have had the opportunity to vote 'yes' when two 'no' votes are cast. Only 
Brown himself will have had this opportunity, so the set of agents possessing this option 
only includes one member. But if Brown should vote 'no' instead, then both Smith and 
Jones (as well as Brown) will have had the opportunity to vote 'yes' when two 'no' votes 
are cast. Thus, in these circumstances, the set of agents possessing this option includes 
three members. Hence, before Brown himself acts, there is no determinate set of agents 
who have the opportunity of performing acts of type Y, for Brown's eventual action 
forms part of the circumstances which determine the act types of the other agents' 
actions. Since there is no determinate set of agents who have this opportunity, there is 
no way to ascertain what the consequences would be if everyone performed an action of 
type Y. Since he cannot determine the generalized utility of one of his alternatives, there 
is no way for Brown to employ UG in choosing which action he should perform. 
(89-90). 
Thus, UG cannot  be used in such a case as a decision principle;  and a similar 
argument ,  Go ldman  claims, can be used to show that  UG cannot  be used as a 
cr i ter ion o f  rightness and wrongness after the fact. Hence,  while the use of  
'Level-2 '  act descript ions does guarantee,  she argues, that  " the  number  o f  
re levant ly  similar actions in any al ternative set is a cons t an t "  (87), it nei ther  
preserves the extens ional  equivalence o f  UG and A U  nor  makes UG an 
acceptable  mora l  principle.  
II. CRITICISM 1 
My first cr i t icism of  Go ldman ' s  a rgument  is that  it fails to take proper  
account  o f  the fact  that  UG's  concern  wi th  ' everyone ' s  doing the same'  is 
collective ra ther  than distributive. In assessing the 'general ized '  util i t ies of  the  
various alternatives,  UG directs us to de termine  the ut i l i ty  which  would  be 
p roduced  by everyone ' s  per forming  an act o f  the requisi te  type  together or  
'collectively. s Indeed,  a large part o f  the original mot iva t ion  for mora l  
theories based on uti l i tarian general izat ion was precisely that  the col lect ive 
utilities o f  certain sets o f  acts (voting,  lawn crossing, promise breaking,  etc.) 
seemed in each case no t  to be equivalent  to the sum o f  the individual  utili t ies 
o f  the  set 's  members .  6 If  this po in t  is proper ly  applied to the swing set case, 
however ,  it shows (a) that  UG gives the same, ent i re ly  de terminate ,  result 
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using either Goldman's or Lyons' criterion for act descriptions; and (b) that 
'Level-2' descriptions are not sufficient to ensure that the number of persons 
who can do 'the same' remains constant throughout an alternative set. 
Consider again the assumption that Brown chooses to vote 'no'. On this 
assumption, each of the three agents individually has (or had) an act of type 
Y (i.e., an act of voting 'yes' while the other two agents vote 'no') as an 
alternative; thus, in this sense, Goldman is quite right that "the set of agents 
possessing this option includes three members". But the question with which 
UG is concerned is not "How many persons can perform an act of type Y 
individually? " but "How many persons can perform an act of type Y 
collectively or together?" And the answer to this latter question is, of course, 
'one' even if Brown votes no ,  for an act of type Y can be performed only if 
two of the three agents perform those acts of voting 'no' reference to which is 
essential to the description of an act of type Y. Thus, since only one person 
can perform an act of type Y if Brown votes 'yes', as Goldman herself says, 
this means that the answer to the question "How many persons can perform 
an act of type Y collectively? " is 'one' whatever assumption we make about 
Brown's choice, and is therefore entirely determinate. Hence, if UG is 
properly applied, the use of Goldman's 'Level-2' criterion for act-descriptions 
yields exactly the same, determinate, result as Lyons'. On either criterion, it 
is possible that at most three persons (collectively) perform an act of type N; 
on either criterion, it is possible that at most one person (collectively) 
perform an act of type Y: and on either criterion, UG prescribes that Brown 
vote 'no', as the generalized utility of N is 3, whereas the generalized utility 
of Y is 0. 7 
With respect to Goldman's claim that Level-2 descriptions guarantee that 
"the number of relevantly similar actions in any alternative set is a constant", 
the difficulty is that this guarantee extends only to the individual alternatives 
open to the various agents. To return to her schema (87; reproduced above, 
p. 46) it is quite true that, if n agents can perform acts of type A' individually, 
then necessarily n agents van perform acts of type B' individually; but there is 
no guarantee at all that the number who can perform acts of type A'  
collectively is the same as the number who can perform acts of type B' 
collectively. And such a discrepancy between individual and collective 
possibilities is precisely what occurs in the swing-set case. Since, if Brown 
votes 'no', three persons can perform acts of type N individually, the use of 
Level-2 descriptions guarantees that three persons can perform acts of type Y 
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individually; but whereas three persons can perform acts of type N 
collectively, it is possible that at most one person perform an act of type Y 
collectively. 
Some readers, however, may feel that there is something paradoxical about 
this sort of discrepancy. One possible source of uneasiness here is the fact 
that, where the number who can perform actions of a certain sort collectively 
is fewer than the number who can perform such acts individually, the 
collective possibility is not assignable to particular persons. Assuming that 
Brown chooses to vote 'no', we can say that it is possible that at most one 
person perform an act of type Y collectively; yet we cannot say of any of the 
three agents individually that this possibility applies to him rather than to one 
of the others. But there is nothing at all paradoxical about this; it simply 
illustrates the point that modal predicates, like many others, do not 
necessarily distribute to the members of a group when they are applied to the 
group itself. And one important implication of this is that Goldman is 
mistaken in her claim that, to determine what action UG prescribes, one must 
identify the set o f  agents who have the opportunity to perform acts of the 
relevant sorts. For where collective and individual possibilities do not match, 
as the swing set case illustrates, such identification is neither possible nor 
necessary. Such identification is not possible, in the swing set case, since 
assuming that Brown votes 'no', the one possible 'collective' act of type Y 
cannot be assigned to any particular agent; yet such identification is not 
necessary, since the question "How many acts of type Y can be performed 
collectively, or together?" nonetheless admits of a determinate answer (viz., 
'one'). Thus, the claim that such identification is essential is itself simply one 
aspect of Goldman's general failure to appreciate the fact that UG's concern 
with "everyone's doing the same" is collective. 
We are still left, however, with the problem of explaining precisely why 
individual and collective possibilities, in cases like the swing set case, fail to 
coincide; for it is only through such an explanation that the feeling of 
paradox can be permanently eliminated. The basis for such an explanation 
lies in the fact that what is properly taken as 'given' - i.e., as part of the 
'surrounding circumstances' - i n  assessing the alternatives open to an 
individual agent differs not only from what is properly taken as given in 
assessing the alternatives open to a different agent, but from what is properly 
taken as given in assessing the alternatives open to the relevant set of  agents 
taken collectively. Suppose, for example, that all three agents in the swing set 
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case do in fact vote 'no'.  In assessing the alternatives that are (or were) open 
to Brown, we would regard the 'no '  votes of  both Smith and Jones, but not, 
of  course, the 'no '  vote of  Brown himself, as given. On the other hand, in 
assessing Smith's alternatives we would take the 'no '  votes o f  Jones and 
Brown, but not that of  Smith, as given; and in Jones's case, analogously, we 
would take the 'no '  votes of  Smith and Brown, but not that of  Jones, as 
given. And finally, in assessing the alternatives open to the three taken 
collectively, we would not regard any of  their 'no '  votes as given. And it is 
these differences in what is to be taken as given which create the discrepancy 
between what is possible collectively and what is possible individually. It is 
possible that only one person perform an act of  type Y collectively, because 
such an act is possible, as was noted above, only if two of  the three perform 
the acts of  voting 'no '  reference to which constitutes an essential part of  the 
description of  an act of  type Y. Yet each of  the three individually has an act 
of  type Y as an alternative, because the assessment of  alternatives for each 
individual properly takes the 'no '  votes of each of  the other two as given. 
Each agent individually can perform an act of  type Y because for each agent 
an act of  voting 'yes' while the other two vote 'no '  is entirely consistent with 
the circumstances properly regarded as 'given' in assessing his alternatives; but  
- and this is the crucial point - a 'yes' vote by a given agent is not consistent 
with what is properly regarded as 'given' in assessing the individual 
alternatives open to either of  the other two. It is precisely for this reason that 
the collective possibility as regards acts of  type Y cannot be determined 
simply by 'adding up'  the individual possibilities, and indeed cannot be 
assigned to particular individuals at all. 
III. CRITICISM 2 
My second criticism of Goldman's argument concerns the hypothetical 
assumptions one properly, indeed necessarily, makes in assessing alternatives. 
Suppose that an agent, Green, has two alternative, a and b, and consider how 
AU is used to decide what he should do. It is quite true that he cannot take 
his choice as 'given' in the sense that, as was discussed in the preceding 
paragraph, he may quite properly take the choices of  others as 'given'; for to 
view one's own act as given in this sense is just to view oneself as having no 
choice at all, and hence, as being in a situation where the whole question of  
decision making does not arise. But while Green cannot view his choice as 
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'given' in this sense, it nonetheless remains the case that the assessment of  the 
utility of  each of  his alternatives must be based on the assumption that that 
alternative is chosen. That is, the questions "What utility would result from 
a? " and "What utility would result from b?" must obviously be interpreted 
to mean "On the assumption that Green does a, what would its utility be? " 
and "On the assumption that Green does b, what would its utility be? " 
respectively; for apart from those assumptions no determinate assessment of  
utility is, of  course, possible. Again, suppose that if Green does a, this will 
induce White to do c, whereas if Green does b, this will induce White to do d, 
and that White's choice affects the long range utility of  Green's choice. It 
would clearly be a mistake for Green to complain that "AU gives no 
determinate result in this situation; for White's choice makes a difference to 
the utility o f  my choice, and yet until I act, there is no determinate answer to 
the question 'What will White choose? '"  For Green is to assess each of  his 
alternatives on the assumption that that alternative is chosen, and hence, on 
the assumption that White makes the choice which that alternative would 
induce. Since the question "What utility would result from a?" is to be 
answered on the assumption that a is chosen, it is to be answered on the 
assumption that White does c; similarly, since the question "What utility 
would result from b?" is to be answered on the assumption that b is chosen, 
it is to be answered on the assumption that White does d. Thus, while there is 
a sense in which White's choice - and for that matter Green's own choice - is 
indeterminate before Green acts, this in no way impfies that AU fails to give a 
determinate result for this case. 
Similar assumptions, however, are implicit in the use of  UG - i.e., in the 
assessment o f  the generalized utilities of  one's alternatives. Indeed, the 
assumptions implicit in the use of  UG are even stronger than those implicit in 
the use of  AU; fully unpacked, the question "What generalized utility would 
result from a?" becomes "On the assumption that Green and as many others 
as can perform actions of  the type exemplified by a, what would the utility 
(the 'simple' utility) of  this 'collective' action be? ''8 And this point alone, 
quite apart from my first criticism, is sufficient to refute Goldman's claim 
that, if we use her criterion for act descriptions, UG fails to give a 
determinate result for the swing set case; for this claim, we now see, is 
mistaken in just the way that the claim that AU fails to give a determinate 
result for Green's case was mistaken. Brown's assessment o f  the generalized 
utility of  his Y-alternative should be an assessment of  the utility which would 
52 HARRY S. SILVERSTEIN 
result on the assumption that he and as many others as can perform acts of  
type Y (hence, the question "How many persons can perform acts of  type Y 
if Brown votes 'no '?"  is a question which he need not even consider); 
similarly, his assessment of  the generalized utility of  his N-alternative should 
be an assessment of  the utility which would result on the assumption that he 
and as many others as can perform acts of  type N. And it follows from this 
that UG gives the same, perfectly determinate, result using either Goldman's 
or Lyon's criterion for act descriptions even if my first criticism is waived - 
that is, even if we grant, for the sake of  argument, that UG is concerned with 
the number who can perform acts of  the requisite sorts individually (and, 
hence, that if Brown votes 'no '  the question "How many can perform acts of  
type Y?" is properly answered 'three'), and that the use of  UG requires that 
one be able to identify the agents who have the opportunity to perform acts 
of  the requisite sorts. For even granting all o f  this, the application of  UG to 
the swing set case, using Goldman's criterion for act descriptions, proceeds as 
follows: on the assumption that Brown and as many others as can perform 
acts of  type Y, exactly one person (namely, Brown himself) can perform an 
act of  the requisite Level-2 type, and the utility produced is 0; 9 on the 
assumption that Brown and as many others as can perform acts of  type iV, 
exactly three persons (Brown, Smith, and Jones) can perform acts of  the 
requisite Level-2 type, and the utility produced is 3; hence, UG gives the 
perfectly dete'rminate result that Brown should vote 'no '  - the same 
conclusion, reached in the same manner, as that which results using Lyons' 
criterion. 
In sum, Goldman makes two, independent mistakes, the recognition of  
either one of  which is sufficient to refute both her claim that the use of  
Level-2 descriptions insures that the number of  persons who can do 'the 
same' remains constant throughout an alternative set, 1~ and her claim that 
UG fails to give determinate results in cases like the swing set case if we adopt 
her Level-2 criterion. 
IV. GENUINELY INDETERMINATE CASES 
I would like to conclude by discussing briefly a certain type of  case in which 
it is indeed true that one cannot derive a determinate result for individual 
decisions, a type o f  case which one might confuse with the sort of  case 
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Goldman considers, and which in any event throws light on the general issue 
of indeterminacy. Briefly, while no special indeterminacy results from the use 
of  UG, which is in some sense a collective principle,  as the basis for individual 
decisions or prescriptions, there are cases where collective decisions or 
prescriptions,  whether based on AU, UG, or some other principle, do not 
determine individual decisions or prescriptions. Consider the following 
modified swing set case. If at least two of the three agents vote 'no',  the 
utility produced is 9; if exactly two out of three vote 'yes', the utility 
produced is 10; and if all three vote 'yes', the Utility produced is 8 (we can 
suppose, for example, that the utility of the swing set itself is 14, but that 
two utiles must be deducted from each 'yes' vote because the wife of each 
'yes' voter nags him about his extravagance). Suppose further that it is 
common knowledge that each of the three agents uses AU as a decision 
principle, but that the agents are prevented from discussing their votes with 
one another in advance. In this case AU provides a determinate prescription 
for the three taken collectively - i.e., it stipulates that there should be two 
'yes' votes and one 'no' vote, since this is the collective decision which 
maximizes utility. But it fails to give a determinate result for any of the three 
individually, because there is no way to derive prescriptions for the 
individuals making up the group from the prescription directed to the group 
itself, given that the three agents cannot communicate with one another 
before voting. Brown cannot know what he should do without knowing in 
advance what Jones and Smith will do; for if, e.g., Jones and Smith both vote 
'yes' then Brown should vote 'no',  whereas if either Jones or Smith votes 'yes' 
while the other votes 'no', then Brown should vote 'yes'. But the votes of 
Smith and Jones depend on how they think they should vote; and neither of 
the two can know how he should vote without knowing in advance how the 
other two, including Brown, will vote. Hence, the attempt of any individual 
to determine how he should vote results in a vicious regress. The difficulty 
here, however, is not the result of  using a collective principle, for AU is not 
such a principle; and indeed this sort of  difficulty can arise using any 
principle the application of which, in certain situations, requires knowledge 
of how others will act. The difficulty, rather, derives from the fact that (a) 
the collective prescription ("Let it be the case that two vote 'yes' while one 
votes 'no' ") does not distribute in and of itself; and (b) the impossibility of 
advance communication prevents the three from instituting any of the 
special, artificial procedures (drawing of straws, flipping of coins, etc.) which 
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are c o m m o n l y  used to  force distr ibutive results f rom essential ly nondis t r ibu-  
tive prescr ipt ions .  11 
Thus,  there  are indeed  instances where  the  appl ica t ion  o f  a given principle 
under  given cond i t ions  to  a given s i tuat ion yields no  de te rmina te  result for  
individual decisions.  The appl icat ion o f  UG and Goldman ' s  'Level-2 '  cr i ter ion 
to  the  swing set case, however ,  is no t  such an instance.  
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2 David Lyons, Forms and Limits o f  Utilitarianism, Oxford University Press, London, 
1965. 
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application of AU to the same case using what she takes to be Lyons' notion of 
'consequences' (92). It might be objected, however, that the one 'yes' vote should be 
given at least as much credit as the two 'no' votes for the three utiles produced by not 
getting the swing set and, hence, that if the generalized utility of N is 3, the generalized 
utility of Y cannot be 0. But I shall not pursue this issue as it has no bearing on my 
primary objections to Goldman's argument. 
8 We cannot, as might be thought, simplify "On the assumption that Green and as many 
others as can ..." to "On the assumption that as many as can...". For if (as is true of acts 
of type Y in the swing set case) the collective possibilities vis-a-vis the performance of 
acts similar to a do riot distribute to individuals, to say only that "as many as can" 
perform acts of the type exemplified by a is not to say that Green performs such an act 
or even that he individually, given our assumptions about the behavior of others, can 
perform such an act. But UG does not require Green to consider the generalized utility 
of a in the first place except on the assumption that a is indeed an alternative open to 
him individually. Hence, our statement of the assumption must insure that a is a 
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possibility for Green individually, and must therefore explicitly single him out in the 
way 1 have done in the text. 
+ We cannot grant all the above and still get determinate results for cases in which the 
number of collectively possible acts of a given type is greater than one and yet not 
assignable to particular individuals; if the swing set case, for example, were modified in 
such a way that two acts of type Y were collectively possible, we would not be able to 
assign the second possible such act to either Smith or Jones individually (though we 
would still be able to assign one of the possibilities to Brown - cf. the preceding 
footnote). Hence, while Criticism l is sufficient to refute Goldman's indeterminacy 
claim for such cases, Criticism 2 taken by itself is not. 
1 o Criticism 2 refutes this claim, as the preceding discussion of the swing set case 
illustrates, by showing that the assumptions to be used in determining how many persons 
can perform aots of a given sort differ from alternative to alternative. And this 
refutation, unlike that implicit in Criticism 1, succeeds even on the supposition that UG 
is concerned with individual rather than collective possibilities. 
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Cornman's Utilitarian Kantian Principle', Philosophical Studies 23 (1972), 212-215; 
Martin and Ruf, 'Silverstein's Defense of Cornman', Philosophical Studies 23 (1972), 
319-323; and Silverstein, 'Reply to Martin and Ruf', Philosophical Studies 23 (1972), 
324-326. 
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Harry S. Silvers~in claims that I am mistaken in arguing that employing 
'level-2' act descriptions yields a version of UG which is unable to deliver any 
determinate prescriptions at all in an important range of cases. 1 According to 
Silverstein, my argument for this conclusion rests on two separate errors. 
First, UG requires us to calculate what the consequences would be if 
everyone having the opportunity to perform an act of type A were to do so. 
But, as Silverstein points out, this is ambiguous; it could mean either 
"everyone who has the opportunity to perform an act of type A as an 
individual", or "everyone who has the opportunity to perform an act of  type 
A collectively or together". I employ the former, 'distributive', interpreta- 
tion, and argue that since it is not always possible for individually-possible 
acts to be jointly performed, the results of  such a joint performance cannot 
be calculated and UG cannot give any prescription for action. Silverstein 
states correctly that use of the collective interpretation would avoid this 
difficulty. Although I disagree with his contention that the collective 
interpretation is the only one consistent with the spirit of  UG, clearly it 
constitutes a legitimate alternative, indeed one which has previously been 
investigated by Howard Sobel, who supposes that such versions of UG will be 
coextensional with their AU counterparts. 2 
It is Silverstein's second criticism I wish to explore. According to UG, an 
action is right if and only if the consequences of everyone's performing that 
sort of action would be at least as good as the consequences of everyone's 
performing any alternative sort of  action. In order to apply this principle, we 
must know how many agents the term 'everyone' refers to. In my original 
paper, I described cases in which the act chosen by the agent himself affects 
the number of  other agents who will have opportunity to perform acts of  the 
same sort. Since the agent cannot coherently ask whether he ought to 
perform act a, and at the same time assume that he is in fact going to perform 
it (in order to calculate how many others will have that opportunity), from 
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his pbint of view the number of agents who will have the opportunity in 
question must remain indeterminate. In view of this indeterminacy, there is 
no way to derive a determinate prescription from UG. 
Silverstein claims that even on the distributive interpretation the number 
of agents who comprise 'everyone' is determinate in these cases, and hence 
UG gives determinate prescriptions. He urges that just as when (for example) 
Green applies AU to his case, he must ask "On the assumption that I perform 
act a, what would its utility be?" so when Green applies UG to his case, he 
must ask "On the assumption that I and as many others as can perform 
actions of the type exemplified by a, what would the utility of this 'collec- 
tive' action be?" In other words, he contends that the term 'everyone' refers 
to the set of agents who would have a certain opportunity on the condition 
that Green availed himself of that opportunity. 
This is undoubtedly a legitimate and plausible interpretation of the term 
'everyone', but it is not the correct interpretation to use in criticising Lyons' 
theory. Lyons explicitly stipulates that 'everyone' is to be understood as 
"that class of persons each of whom will have occasion to do the sort of thing 
specified, to each of whom such a course of action is or will be a practical 
possibility. ''3 Since my argument is specifically directed against Lyons, of 
course I used his non-conditional interpretation of the term 'everyone', rather 
than the conditional interpretation proposed by Silverstein. And on Lyons' 
interpretation, the number of agents who will have the opportunity to 
perform acts of  type A may indeed be pragmatically indeterminate. 
Even if we adopt Silverstein's interpretation, however, we find that 
although the number of  agents who comprise 'everyone' is determinate, the 
prescriptions generated by UG are not. Silverstein's definition can be stated as 
follows: 
I. everyone = all those would have the opportunity to 
perform an act of type A i fa  were performed. 
To see why use of  this definition (on the distributive interpretation) does not 
yield determinate prescriptions, consider the following case. Smith, Jones, 
Green, and White are all walking down the street in that order. Each has a 
dollar bill in his pocket, and no one else is on the street. Their projected paths 
will take them by a Salvation Army officer who needs a contribution of 
exactly one dollar to meet his quota for the day. If he gets the dollar, he will 
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return home, thus eliminating the possibility that any other passer-by will 
have the opportunity to donate to the Army. If  any of the four agents is 
presented with the opportunity to give a dollar, he will do so. Thus Smith, 
the agent who comes first, will have the opportunity to perform an act of 
type A (where A = declining to give $1 to the Salvation Army, when giving 
$1 is the only alternative (since the officer cannot make change), and when 
declining to give will be followed by the next passer-by's giving $1),  and also 
an opportunity to perform an act of type B (where B = giving $1 to the 
Army, when the only alternative is to give nothing). Depending what previous 
agents do, Jones and Green may have the opportunity to perform acts of 
these kinds. White cannot in any event have such opportunities, since his 
declining to give would not be followed by any passer-by's giving $1,  insofar 
as the officer will return home if he gets four straight refusals. 
Smith, the first agent to pass by, gives his dollar. According to definition I, 
exactly two agents are included in 'everyone', since if Smith took his 
opportunity to decline, then Jones would have the same opportunity. (Since 
Jones would actually donate his dollar under such circumstances, Green 
would not have the opportunity to decline. Smith's performing act b implies 
that Jones will in fact donate his dollar, but this of  course is not incompatible 
with his having the opportunity to decline to donate.) Thus 'everyone' refers 
to a determinate number of  agents. But if we now ask what the consequences 
would be if everyone performed an act of  type A, we see at once that there is 
no clear answer to this question. 'Everyone' includes Smith, and his 
performing an act of type A (i.e., declining to give when doing so will be 
followed by the next passer-by's giving a dollar) implies that Jones, who is the 
next passer-by, gives a dollar. But Jones is also included in 'everyone', so we 
must hypothesize that he declines to give a dollar. Thus everyone's 
performing an act of type A involves both Jones' giving and his declining to 
give a dollar - a state of affairs which is patently impossible, and one whose 
consequences cannot be estimated. Contrary to Silverstein's claim, even on 
definition I, UG gives no determinate prescriptions in certain kinds of  cases. 
It is worth pointing out that 'everyone' can be defined in still another way. 
This way, which is perhaps initially even more plausible than definition I, 
may have been the one Silverstein had in mind, but it fails even to pick out a 
determinate set of agents and hence leaves UG itself indeterminate. Just as 
one agent's performing an act may enable others to perform acts of  that sort, 
so their performing those acts may enable Still another set of agents to 
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perform acts of that sort. This suggests the following definition: 
II. everyone = all those who would have the opportunity to 
perform an act of type A if (1) act a were 
performed, and (2) all those who would have 
the opportunity to perform an act of type A 
i fa  were performed, performed these acts, ..., 
(n) all those who would have the opportunity 
to perform an act of type A if the acts mentioned 
in clause ( n - l )  were performed, performed 
these acts. 
The problem arises clearly when we apply this definition to the Salvation 
Army case. According to definition II, 'everyone' refers to all those agents 
who would have the opportunity to perform an act of type A under certain 
conditions. One of these is stated in clause (2), i.e., the condition that all 
those who would have the opportunity to perform an act of  type A if Smith 
performed a, performed those acts. We have just seen that Smith and Jones 
comprise the set of  all those who would have the opportunity to perform an 
act of type A if Smith did a - but also that it is impossible for both Smith 
and Jones to perform such acts. So clause (2) cannot be satisfied, and the set 
of all those who would have a certain opportunity if clause (2) were satisfied 
is indeterminate. Because 'everyone' thus remains indeterminate, UG cannot 
deliver prescriptions in this case. 
Silverstein is wrong in claiming that his conditional definition of 
'everyone' is the one appropriate to use in criticising Lyons' theory, since 
Lyons explicitly adopts an unconditional interpretation. He is also wrong in 
claiming that UG gives determinate prescriptions when the distributive 
interpretation and a conditional definition of 'everyone' (whether definition I 
or II) are employed. But his criticisms have the virtue of calling attention to 
these alternative ways of interpreting crucial terms in the context of UG. 4 
University of  Michigan 
REPLY TO S I L V E R S T E I N  61 
NOTES 
Harry S. Sitverstein, 'Goldman's "Level-2" Act Descriptions and Utilitarian 
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4 This paper was written during my tenure as a Fellow of the American Association of 
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